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the effect of the boy's negligence by finding that the defendant
lifeguard had the last clear chance to save the victim. In order
to adopt this attack it was necessary to deal with the temporal
sequence between the time at which the patron became helpless
and the time when his danger was obvious to the lifeguard.
This writer suggests that the right to recovery in cases of
this kind should not be made to depend upon the fortuities of last
clear chance. Should contributory negligence ever operate as a
defense in a suit based upon the inattention of a professional
lifeguard? If the patrons of a public pool could aways be ex-
pected to shepherd their own welfare with the care of the my-
thical reasonable man there would be little basis for the universal
requirement of lifeguards at such places. The expectable risk
of heedlessness by patrons is the most prominent danger that
faces the proprietor of a pool. He therefore must undertake to
afford a safeguard against this very hazard and to watch over
those who get into danger irrespective of whether they are or
are not to blame for their own predicament. If the duty is to
protect the patron against the consequences of his own careless-
ness, it would seem highly inappropriate to allow the defendant
to set up that same carelessness as a bar to recovery. 35 There
is no policy whatever to support the defense of contributory
negligence in a case of this kind, and resort to the confusion of
last clear chance should be unnecessary.
TORTS-TRAFFIC CASES
William E. Craw ford*
In Monger v. McFarlain,l the court held the defendant's con-
duct to be negligent per se, but found no liability because the
negligence was passive, which, as two dissenting opinions point-
ed out, is contrary to the landmark case of Dixie Drive-it-Your-
self.2 A casenotel in the prior issue discusses the problem thor-
oughly.
35. Cf. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La.
471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962) (duty to avoid obstructing highway exists to protect
against the risk that car approaching later might strike obstruction through driver's
failure to be alert; although the problem in this case centered on the issue of
proximate cause, the problem is basically the same where contributory negligence
is involved: Whenever the purpose of the defendant's duty is to protect against
the prospect of someone else's carelessness, that same carelessness should not be
asserted by defendant in order to defeat recovery.)
*Assistant Dean of the Law School; Associate Professor of Law.
1. 204 So.2d 86 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
2. Dixie Drive-it-Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471,
137 So.2d 298 (1962).
3. Note, 29 LA. L. REv. 167 (1968).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Texas & Pac. R.R. held that a mo-
torist was contributorily negligent for driving at a rate of speed
which, while within the legal speed limit, was such that he was
unable to stop in time to avoid a train which appeared in a blind
crossing protected by red signal lights that were not in operation
at the time of the accident. No bell, horn, or whistle was sounded
by the train. The majority opinion found that the plaintiff was
within 400 feet of the crossing when the locomotive came into
view. He applied his brakes and left 151 feet of skid marks be-
fore striking the rear of the first car behind the locomotive,
which was going 28 miles per hour. The court found as a fact
that the red signal lights were not working at the time of the
accident.
It is difficult to imagine a more sinister trap than an already
dangerous crossing protected by prominently displayed, but in-
operative, red signal lights; yet, this case lays down the rule
that a motorist must approach such crossings at a speed which
will enable him to stop should a train suddenly and without
warning appear at the crossing. Contributory negligence, under
the rule would be virtually automatic for the motorist, since in
the case at hand the motorist was driving within the legal speed
limit and applied his brakes at the earliest possible moment after
he had notice of the train. No statutes required him to stop for
the crossing. May a motorist rely even to the slightest degree on
the red signal lights? Apparently not.
The court in the instant case relied heavily on a 1952 opinion
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal,5 which in turn relied on
jurisprudence going back as early as 1909 and 1902.6 In the case
at hand, the dissenting opinion vainly protested that a more
contemporary balancing of duties was called for. Perhaps a rule
akin to that permitting motorists to assume that others will obey
traffic control signals would be in order. Then, if the red signal
light were not operating, a motorist could assume no train was
approaching and need not prepare to stop unless in some way he
was alerted to danger. It might well be that the public's driving
habits are in that vein and are irreversible, since the very pres-
4. 209 So.2d 561 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
5. Audirsch v. Texas & P. By., 195 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1952).
6. Gibbens v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 159 La. 347, 105 So. 367 (1925)
(gates did not close) ; Barnhill v. Texas & P. By., 109 La. 43, 33 So. 63 (1902)
(decedent was one-legged pedestrian with obscured view of track) ; Kentucky & I.
Bridge & R.R. v. Singheiser, 115 S.W. 192 (1909) (plaintiff in horse-drawn wag-
on was struck by gate as it lowered).
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ence of the red signal lights so strongly encourages reliance on
them.
In Piquet v. Stiaes, the court barred a plaintiff for failure
to avail himself of the last clear chance in a typical intersec-
tional collision in which the defendant came through the neutral
ground section of a divided boulevard and was struck by the
plaintiff. The doctrine of last clear chance evolved to relieve a
negligent plaintiff of the harshness of the contributory negli-
gence doctrine. The court used it here to bar the plaintiff. It
would seem a more simple approach to hold that this plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence in not keeping a proper
look-out and for not having his car under sufficient control to
stop in time to avoid the defendant; however, the result reached





In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Richard, the debtor failed to
meet certain scheduled payments and the creditor did nothing
about it until he called upon the surety after the debtor had
physically departed from the jurisdiction. The surety's plea of
release by reason of a time extension without his consent was
dismissed because the facts did not show any agreement for
valuable consideration which would have precluded the creditor's
right of action for any stipulated length of time. It is sometimes
difficult to evaluate the facts but the court had no difficulty in
this case in concluding that there had been a gratuitous for-
bearance or mere indulgence, and therefore the surety was not
released. There was no dispute about the law, and both sides
agreed that the governing law was stated in the previous case of
O'Banion v. Willis2 (which actually held the other way and with
a strong dissent), but it is surprising that there is no mention
in the court's opinion of Civil Code Article 3063,3 which is the
real basic law for this situation.
7. 198 So.2d 496 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 209 So.2d 95 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
2. 14 La. App. 638, 129 So. 440 (1st Cir. 1930).
a. "The prolongation of the terms granted to the principal debtor without the
consent of the surety, operates a discharge of the latter."
